American Liberalism and World Politics 1931-1941_Volume 1.pdf Younghill Kang

American Liberalism and World Politics 1931-1941_Volume 1.pdf

Fischer in the Nation had already taken the Russians and Japanese

to war. His July dispatch, "The Soviet-Japanese War," was even more

urgent in its call for American support of the Communists: 51

A friendly American gesture toward Russia could strengthen Russia's

hand . . . and guarantee a greater measure of peace in the Pacific. The

only consideration which will finally sober the Japanese militarists is the

knowledge that in the event of war against the Soviet Union, America

might help the Soviets. To be sure, the United States government does

not like Bolsheviks and will not recognize a regime now approaching its

fifteenth anniversary celebration. But if America wishes to prevent another war in which it is likely to be involved, the best thing to do is to

improve 'tVashington's relations with the Kremlin.

Fischer reviewed the embarrassment already being suffered by America, plus the expense of keeping a fleet in the Pacific and the contemplation that Japan would surely get the Philippines if we set

them free. In addition to this was the closing of Manchuria to United

States investments and exports. The situation would be threatening

for some time, he promised, but "final security" lay in the mounting

industrial power of the Soviet Union and in the economic decline

of Japan.

Two weeks after this report, Owen Lattimore's Manchuria: Cradle

of Conflict was reviewed in the Nation by a Korean named Younghill

Kang, at that time a member of the English Department of New

York University, and the person to whom most books about Japan,

especially favorable ones, were for a time turned over for criticism.

Kang told the readers that Lattimore predicted in his book that

Russia and not Japan or China would win Manchuria. He also

expressed pleasure at Lattimore's on-the-spot revelation that Russia

was "rapidly developing a specifically Russian non-Western technique of warfare/' which he thought was "the cause of intense interest

185 The Explosion of the Far East and Liberal Reconsiderations

and no little alarm to Western nations." Also considered of particular interest to the readers of America's outstanding pacifist literary

weekly was the statement, "The Russian Army is an engine of

unknown power and very great importance." 52 It was now possible to

turn and read of Litvinov's scolding of the Germans for seeking arms

equality while the Soviet built in secrecy and in numbers nobody

felt competent enough to guess.

Again in September, in its editorial "Meeting Japan's Challenge,"

the Nation plugged strongly for Russian recognition, this time in

order to forestall a hinted Russian recognition of Manchukuo in

return for Japanese trade privileges, and also "to make Soviet Russia

a part of the common front against Japan." 53 In 1932, the liberals

were anticipating, not a Hitler-Stalin pact, but a Stalin-Japanese pact.

Fischer's November dispatch, "A Soviet-Japanese Deal Against America?" stressed the same possibility, excused because of Russian fears

of Japan as a close neighbor. To inhibit the two from coming to an

understanding there was no better prescription than American recognition; Fischer hopefully suggested: "If there were any real statesmen

in Washington, they would know how to take advantage of this

situation." 54