2026년 9월 4일 금요일

미 특수부대의 괴물화와 비밀 작전의 실체 (w/ Seth Harp) | The Chris Hedges Report - YouTube

Drug Trafficking and Murder In the Special Forces (w/ Seth Harp) | The Chris Hedges Report - YouTube

Drug Trafficking and Murder In the Special Forces (w/ Seth Harp) |
The Chris Hedges YouTube Channel
348,852 views  Oct 16, 2025  The Chris Hedges Report
Seth Harp chronicles how Special Forces atrocities abroad fuel a cycle of crime and violence that starts overseas and makes it way back home — especially in and around the secretive Fort Bragg military base. 
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(0:00) Intro 
(2:49) What is Delta Force? 
(4:20) Counterproductive Special ops 
(6:40) F3EAD intelligence 
(7:48) Billy Lavigne’s violence 
(12:37) Drug use 
(15:58) Patriots vs. degens 
(17:01) Waco cult shooting
(20:44) Ali Mohammed 
(25:14) Military psy-ops 
(28:26) Turbocharging special ops
(32:50) Indiscriminate killings / low quality intel 
(35:26) The US funded the largest cartel in the world 
(43:06) Michael Hastings’ mysterious death 
(46:12) Lavigne’s death
(49:53) Los Zetas
(53:48) The Return of Fort Bragg 
(59:46) Outro
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세스 하프(Seth Harp)의 저서 <포트 브래그 카르텔>(The Fort Bragg Cartel)을 다룬 대담 영상에 대한 요약과 평론입니다.

<요약>

<미 특수부대의 괴물화와 비밀 작전의 실체>

  • 델타포스와 그린베레 등 약 7만 명 규모의 특수작전부대는 의회와 대중의 감시 및 책임에서 완전히 배제된 채 테러와의 전쟁 과정에서 사실상 하이테크 암살단(Death Squad)으로 전락했다.

  • 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 부정확한 첩보와 통신 감청에 의존한 야간 급습 및 무차별 사살이 횡행했으며, 이는 현지 저항 세력을 약화하기는커녕 탈레반과 반군 세력을 결집시키는 역효과만 낳았다.

<약물 남용과 군 내부의 방조>

  • 작전 지속성과 수면 부족을 견디기 위해 군 차원에서 덱스트로암페타민(애더럴)을 정기적으로 처방했다. 이는 군인들의 공격성을 자극하고 공감 능력을 거세하는 기제로 작용했다.

  • 빌리 라빈(Billy Lavigne) 등 부대원 다수는 군의 각성제 처방을 시작으로 코카인, 헤로인, 필로폰 등 극단적인 마약 중독으로 빠져들었으며, 극도의 아드레날린 중독과 트라우마를 마약과 알코올로 통제하는 환경이 조성되었다.

<마약 밀매와 범죄 네트워크의 결합>

  • 미국이 지원한 아프가니스탄 괴뢰 정권과 군벌들이 세계 최대 규모의 헤로인 카르텔로 기능하면서, 특수부대 역시 해당 마약 유통 경로와 직접 연루되었다.

  • 포트 브래그 인근의 민간 비행장(래포드 강하 구역) 등은 1980년대부터 특수부대 군인들의 마약 항공 밀수 거점으로 활용되었다.

  • 특수전 훈련을 통해 습득한 감시 회피, 공중 강하, 비정규전 기술은 전역자 및 현역 군인들이 멕시코 카르텔(로스 세타스 등)의 고문으로 활동하거나 직접 마약 밀매 조직을 운영하는 범죄 역량으로 전용되었다.

<국내로 전이된 폭력과 은폐>

  • 해외에서 벌어진 극단적 폭력은 미 본토 기지 주변의 살인, 배우자 살해, 의문의 죽음으로 이어졌다.

  • 군 지휘부는 명예 실추와 책임 회피를 위해 이러한 범죄를 말라리아 치료제(라리암) 부작용 탓으로 돌리는 등 대언론 심리전을 벌여 은폐하거나 군 사법 체계를 통해 무마했다.

  • 트럼프 행정부와 헤그세스 국방장관 등은 전쟁 범죄자를 사면하고 기지 이름을 포트 브래그로 환원시키는 등 특수부대 내의 위법성과 폭력 문화를 영웅화·정당화하고 있다.

<평론>

<제국주의적 개입이 낳은 내부 식민지화와 폭력의 부메랑> 하프가 고발하는 포트 브래그의 현실은 제국주의 군사주의가 외부로 쏟아낸 폭력이 결국 내부로 회귀한다는 역사적 법칙을 적나라하게 보여준다. 미 군사 조직이 해외 점령지에서 운용한 비밀 작전, 고문, 무차별 암살은 '국가 안보'라는 추상적 대의로 포장되었으나, 그 본질은 초법적 폭력의 면책특권에 불과했다. 이 과정에서 양성된 특수부대원들은 규율을 지키는 국가의 군인이 아니라, 폭력 그 자체와 마약성 각성에 중독된 사설 용병 혹은 범죄 조직의 성격을 띠게 되었다.

<훈련된 살인 기술의 범죄 시장화> 국가가 천문학적인 세금을 들여 개발한 침투, 암살, 공중 낙하, 감시 회피 기술이 마약 카르텔의 운영 매뉴얼로 이전되는 과정은 군산복합체와 범죄 지하경제가 구조적으로 결합되어 있음을 드러낸다. 멕시코의 잔혹한 카르텔 로스 세타스가 미 특수부대의 훈련을 받은 엘리트 군인들로부터 출발했다는 점이나, 포트 브래그의 델타포스 대원이 카르텔의 고문으로 변모한 사례는 국가가 독점하던 물리적 폭력이 통제를 벗어났을 때 어떤 괴물이 탄생하는지 증명한다.

<면책특권과 은폐가 완성한 도덕적 파탄> 군 지휘부와 사법 당국은 문제를 정화하기는커녕 대중과 언론을 상대로 심리전을 펼치며 사건을 축소하고 범죄를 은폐하는 데 급급했다. 이는 군 조직이 스스로의 존속과 기득권을 위해 사회적 감시망을 무력화해 온 부패한 카르텔과 다를 바 없음을 보여준다. 나아가 정치권이 이러한 범죄자들을 애국주의의 상징으로 추켜세우고 사면하는 현실은, 미국 사회가 제국적 팽창의 대가로 지불해야 할 도덕적 붕괴와 폭력의 일상화가 이미 돌이킬 수 없는 지경에 이르렀음을 시사한다.

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<Drug Trafficking and Murder in the Special Forces> — 요약 평론

이 자료는 2025년 10월 16일 <The Chris Hedges Report>에서 크리스 헤지스(Chris Hedges)가 탐사보도 기자 세스 하프(Seth Harp)를 인터뷰한 약 1시간 분량의 대화록이다. 중심 주제는 하프의 책 <The Fort Bragg Cartel: Drug Trafficking and Murder in the Special Forces>이며, 미국 특수전 부대의 비밀주의와 전쟁 경험, 마약, 살인, 그리고 제도적 면책이 어떻게 하나의 문화적·사회적 생태계를 형성했는가를 추적한다.

1. 이 인터뷰가 제기하는 핵심 문제

헤지스가 서두에서 강조하는 것은 “타락한 몇몇 병사”가 아니다. 그가 묻는 것은 <20여 년의 테러와의 전쟁이 미국 군대 내부, 특히 비밀 특수작전 부대에 어떤 인간형과 문화를 만들어냈는가>이다.

하프가 취재한 중심 공간은 노스캐롤라이나의 포트 브래그(Fort Bragg, 한때 Fort Liberty로 개명되었다가 다시 Fort Bragg로 복귀)이다. 델타포스(Delta Force), 그린베레(Green Berets), 기타 특수작전 부대가 집중되어 있는 곳이다. 하프는 이곳을 일종의 “미국 제국의 상처가 국내로 돌아와 드러나는 장소”로 본다.

인터뷰 전체를 꿰는 논리는 대략 다음과 같다.

<비밀전쟁 → 극단적 폭력 경험 → 외부 감독의 부재 → 면책문화 → 정신적 손상과 약물 의존 → 민간사회 복귀 후 폭력·마약·범죄 → 다시 조직의 은폐>

즉 전쟁터에서 허용되던 행동양식이 군 기지의 울타리를 넘어서도 사라지지 않는다는 주장이다.


2. 델타포스와 “죽음의 부대” 문제

하프는 델타포스를 일반 특수부대보다 한 단계 위에 있는 비밀 “special mission unit”으로 설명한다. 특히 아프가니스탄과 이라크에서 이들이 수행한 야간급습과 표적살해 작전에 주목한다.

그가 가장 강하게 비판하는 것은 두 가지이다.

첫째는 <책임성의 부재>이다. 작전 자체가 극도로 비밀이므로 일반 군인이나 현지 정부조차 누가 어떤 정보로 목표를 선정했는지 알기 어렵다는 것이다.

둘째는 <정보의 질>이다. 하프에 따르면 휴대전화 압수, 연락처 분석, 신호정보(SIGINT), 불완전한 현지 정보가 살해대상 목록 작성에 사용되었고, 이 때문에 엉뚱한 사람이 표적이 되는 경우가 상당히 많았다. 그는 아프가니스탄에서 일부 현지 관리들이 특수부대의 잘못된 급습을 지속적으로 문제 삼았다고 설명한다.

이 지점에서 하프의 가장 중요한 주장이 나온다.

<특수전의 군사적 효율성과 정치적 효과는 같은 것이 아니다.>

한두 명의 무장세력을 제거하는 데 성공해도 가족과 마을 주민들을 적으로 돌려놓는다면 전략적으로는 실패일 수 있다는 것이다. 헤지스 역시 엘살바도르 취재 경험을 언급하며 “무차별적인 살해 자체가 반군의 가장 효과적인 모집수단이 될 수 있다”고 맞장구친다.

이 부분은 인터뷰 가운데 가장 설득력이 높다. 전술적 성공이 전략적 실패를 낳을 수 있다는 반란진압전의 오래된 역설을 특수전의 사례를 통해 보여주기 때문이다.


3. 전쟁에서 돌아온 인간에게 무엇이 남는가

이 대화에서 가장 불편하면서도 중요한 부분은 빌리 라빈(Billy Lavigne)의 사례이다.

라빈은 델타포스 대원으로 여러 차례 전투에 참여한 뒤 심각한 약물 문제와 폭력적 행동을 보였고, 결국 2020년 다른 병사 티머시 두마스(Timothy Dumas)와 함께 총격으로 살해된 채 발견된다.

하프가 묘사하는 라빈의 전쟁 경험에는 매우 잔혹한 장면들이 포함되어 있다. 인간의 뇌조직을 먹도록 훈련된 군견에 관한 이야기, 가까운 거리에서 포로를 살해했다는 회고 등이 그것이다. 하프는 이 이야기를 단순히 충격을 주기 위해 넣은 것이 아니라 <20년간 반복적으로 인간을 죽이는 직업이 인간의 정신에 무엇을 남기는가>를 보여주기 위해 제시한다고 말한다.

이어지는 약물 이야기가 중요하다.

특수부대원들은 오랜 임무와 수면박탈을 견디기 위해 Adderall 같은 각성제를 처방받기도 하며, 일부는 이후 코카인·메스암페타민·헤로인 등으로 넘어갔다고 한다. 알코올 역시 광범위한 문제로 묘사된다.

하프의 설명에서 약물은 단순한 쾌락의 수단이 아니다.

<전쟁에 적응하기 위한 약물 → 전쟁으로부터 벗어나기 위한 약물>

이라는 역설이 나타난다.

전투 중에는 잠을 자지 않고 긴장상태를 유지하기 위해 각성제가 필요하고, 귀환 후에는 전쟁에서 얻은 기억·흥분·공허감을 견디기 위해 또 다른 약물이 필요해진다는 것이다.

이것은 이 인터뷰의 가장 깊은 인간학적 주제라고 할 수 있다.


4. 포트 브래그의 마약 세계

책 제목에 “Cartel”이 들어가는 이유도 여기서 드러난다.

하프는 포트 브래그 주변에서 현역·전역 특수부대원들이 국제 마약거래에 관여한 여러 사건을 추적한다. 특히 특수전 요원들의 기술―공중침투, 감시회피, 비밀운송, 무기 사용, 작전보안―이 마약조직에 그대로 전용될 수 있다고 지적한다.

라빈 역시 자신의 회고에서 마약조직이 자신의 군사기술에 관심을 보였다고 썼다고 한다.

이 대목에서 하프가 제시하는 핵심 통찰은 간단하다.

<국가가 비밀전쟁을 수행하기 위해 훈련시킨 기술은 국가의 통제에서 벗어나는 순간 범죄조직에게도 매우 유용한 기술이 된다.>

즉 문제는 병사 개인의 도덕성만이 아니다. 국가가 만들어낸 전문적 폭력능력이 사유화될 위험이다.


5. 아프가니스탄과 헤로인

인터뷰의 가장 정치적인 대목 중 하나이다.

하프는 미국이 아프가니스탄을 점령한 기간 동안 아편·헤로인 생산이 급증했다는 점을 강조하며, 미국이 의존했던 현지 군벌과 정치인들 가운데 상당수가 마약거래에 연루되어 있었다고 주장한다. 북부동맹 세력과 카르자이 정부 주변 인사들을 예로 들면서, 미국의 군사전략이 사실상 마약 네트워크와 공존했다고 본다.

여기서 헤지스는 훨씬 더 강한 표현으로 미국이 “세계 최대의 카르텔을 지원했다”는 방향으로 질문을 끌어간다.

그러나 이 부분은 주의해서 읽어야 한다.

아프가니스탄에서 미국의 동맹세력 일부가 마약거래에 깊이 관여했다는 사실과, <미국 정부가 하나의 마약카르텔처럼 행동했다>는 명제는 동일하지 않다. 또한 미국의 오피오이드 위기를 아프간 헤로인과 직접 연결시키는 설명도 너무 단선적으로 흐를 위험이 있다. 인터뷰 자체에서도 미국 내 처방 오피오이드 남용이 선행했다는 사실이 언급된다.

따라서 이 부분은 중요한 문제제기이지만 하프와 헤지스의 가장 강한 표현들은 별도의 자료로 검증할 필요가 있다.


6. 로스 세타스: 특수전 기술의 “수출된 부메랑”

특히 흥미로운 사례가 멕시코의 로스 세타스(Los Zetas)이다.

그 기원에는 멕시코 특수부대 출신 병사들이 있었으며, 이들은 미국식 특수전 교육을 받은 뒤 국가를 떠나 마약 카르텔의 군사조직이 되었다. 매복, 감시, 통신, 심리전, 소부대 전술 등이 조직범죄에 적용되었다.

하프에게 이것은 단순한 멕시코 마약전쟁사가 아니다.

<미국이 동맹국의 치안을 강화하기 위해 전수한 군사기술이 국가를 이탈한 뒤 오히려 더욱 강력한 범죄조직을 만들어낼 수 있다>는 사례다.

아프가니스탄 군벌과 로스 세타스의 사례를 나란히 놓으면 하프의 책 전체를 이해할 수 있다.

국가는 안보를 위해 폭력 전문가를 만든다.
그러나 그 폭력능력을 영원히 독점할 수 있다는 보장은 없다.


7. 살인과 은폐

포트 브래그 주변에서 일어난 여러 살인도 중요한 부분을 차지한다.

특수부대 출신 병사와 배우자의 죽음, 군인끼리의 살인, 마약거래와 연결된 총격사건 등을 하프는 추적한다. 그의 문제의식은 사건 하나하나의 범인이 누구인가보다 <왜 이런 사건이 반복되는 환경이 형성되었으며, 왜 조직이 이를 외부로부터 감추려 하는가>에 있다.

2002년 특수부대원들이 아내들을 살해한 사건에 대해서도 당시 말라리아 약인 Lariam(mefloquine)이 원인이라는 설명이 언론에 광범위하게 보도되었다고 한다. 하프는 이것을 조직이 자신의 문화적 문제를 약물 부작용이라는 설명으로 전환시킨 사례로 본다.

이런 부분에서 그의 탐사보도는 상당한 힘을 가진다. 개별 범죄를 군대 내부의 조직문화와 연결하기 때문이다.


8. 그러나 가장 조심해서 읽어야 할 부분도 있다

인터뷰 후반에 언급되는 기자 마이클 헤이스팅스(Michael Hastings)의 자동차 사고가 대표적이다.

하프는 그의 죽음을 둘러싼 의문들과 자동차를 원격조종할 수 있는 CIA 기술문서를 언급한다. 그러나 동시에 <살해였다는 증거가 없으며>, 헤이스팅스의 가족 역시 사고사라는 공식 판단을 받아들이고 있음을 인정한다.

따라서 이 부분은 중요한 구분이 필요하다.

<의혹이 존재한다>와 <암살이 일어났다>는 전혀 다른 명제이다.

자료가 뒷받침하는 것은 전자까지이다.

이 구분이 흐려지면 하프가 훨씬 많은 증거를 통해 제시하는 특수부대의 마약·폭력·면책 문제까지 불필요하게 음모론적 색채를 띠게 된다. 이 인터뷰의 가장 약한 부분이다.


평론

이 인터뷰를 단순히 “미국 특수부대의 충격적인 범죄 이야기”로 읽으면 핵심을 놓친다.

하프가 실제로 묻는 것은 더 큰 질문이다.

<국가는 사람에게 살인을 직업으로 가르친 뒤 그 인간을 어떻게 다시 평범한 시민으로 돌려놓을 수 있는가?>

더 나아가,

<국가가 어떤 조직에게 비밀·폭력·면책이라는 세 가지 특권을 동시에 부여했을 때 그 조직의 내부윤리를 누가 통제할 수 있는가?>

라는 질문이다.

이 점에서 이 자료는 상당히 중요한 평화연구 자료가 된다.

전쟁의 대가는 전장에서 죽은 사람의 숫자로 끝나지 않는다. 전쟁을 수행한 군인들의 정신, 가족관계, 지역사회, 경찰문화, 마약시장에까지 오랜 흔적을 남길 수 있다. 헤지스와 하프가 포트 브래그를 하나의 “microcosm”으로 보는 이유도 바로 여기에 있다.

그러나 동시에 <표본의 문제>를 생각해야 한다.

하프는 살인자, 마약거래자, 중독자처럼 극단적인 사례들을 집중적으로 취재한다. 이것이 특수부대 전체를 대표한다고 곧바로 말할 수는 없다. 인터뷰에서도 하프 자신은 높은 윤리의식을 지닌 특수부대원들이 존재한다고 인정한다.

따라서

<특수부대원이어서 범죄자가 된다>

고 읽는 것은 잘못이다.

오히려 그의 주장을 더 정확히 표현하면 다음과 같다.

<극단적인 폭력에 지속적으로 노출되는 조직에 강력한 비밀주의와 약한 외부감독이 결합하면, 일부 구성원의 일탈을 억제하고 교정할 제도적 장치가 약해질 수 있다.>

이것이 훨씬 설득력 있는 명제이다.

또 하나 주목할 점은 크리스 헤지스의 역할이다. 헤지스는 중립적인 인터뷰어라기보다는 미국의 군사주의와 제국주의에 오래 비판적인 논객이다. 따라서 질문 자체가 하프의 사건들을 “미국 제국의 구조적 부패”라는 방향으로 연결한다. 독자는 <하프의 취재 사실>과 <헤지스가 부여하는 정치적 해석>을 어느 정도 분리해서 읽을 필요가 있다.

그럼에도 이 인터뷰가 던지는 가장 중요한 결론은 남는다.

<전쟁에서 만들어진 폭력문화는 국경에서 멈추지 않는다.>

해외에서 비밀리에 행해지는 폭력과 면책을 정상적인 것으로 받아들인 사회는 결국 그 문화가 국내의 경찰, 가족, 범죄세계, 정치에 되돌아오는 것을 경험할 수 있다는 것이다.

그래서 <The Fort Bragg Cartel>은 단순한 범죄 르포가 아니라, <“끝없는 전쟁은 전쟁을 수행하는 사회 자체를 어떻게 변화시키는가”>에 관한 책으로 읽는 것이 가장 적절하다. 그런 의미에서 이 인터뷰의 가장 강력한 주제는 마약도 살인도 아니다. 그것은 <면책(impunity)>이다. 폭력을 사용할 수 있는 권력에 비밀과 면책까지 주어졌을 때, 민주사회가 그것을 다시 통제할 수 있는가라는 질문이 이 대화 전체의 중심에 놓여 있다.

===

Obama is also implicated?
===

네. 다만 이 인터뷰에서 <오바마가 연루되었다>는 말은 정확히 구분해서 이해해야 합니다. 세스 하프는 오바마를 포트 브래그의 마약거래나 살인사건에 직접 연루된 인물로 주장하지 않습니다. 그가 오바마에게 묻는 책임은 <특수전 체제를 엄청나게 확대하고 정상화한 정치적·제도적 책임>입니다.

특히 인터뷰 28분경, “Military psy-ops / Turbocharging special ops” 부분에서 하프는 매우 분명하게 말합니다.

Obama was really the figure that … “turbocharged” these special operations units.

즉 부시 행정부가 9·11 이후 만들어 놓은 대테러전·JSOC·특수작전 체제를 오바마가 축소한 것이 아니라 오히려 대폭 확대했다는 것이 하프의 주장입니다. 그는 이 확대가 “테러조직이 전 세계적으로 연결된 하나의 거대한 적”이라는 서사에 의해 정당화되었다고 비판합니다. 자료의 16–19쪽 부근에서 이 논의가 이어집니다.

오바마에게 돌아가는 책임은 세 층위입니다

첫째, <특수작전의 규모 확대>입니다. 오바마 시대에는 대규모 지상군 투입을 줄이는 대신 JSOC, 드론, 정보기관, 특수부대에 의존하는 방식이 중요한 전쟁수단이 되었습니다. 하프에게 이것은 전쟁을 끝낸 것이 아니라 <전쟁을 더욱 비가시적인 형태로 바꾼 것>입니다.

둘째, <표적살해(targeted killing)를 정상적인 국가정책으로 만든 것>입니다. 인터뷰가 비판하는 “kill list”, 신호정보에 의존한 표적선정, 야간급습, 불완전한 정보에 의한 살해 같은 구조는 부시 시대에 시작됐지만 오바마 시대에도 계속되고 확대되었다고 보는 것입니다. 따라서 하프의 논리에서는 이후 델타포스 내부에 나타난 폭력문화와 완전히 별개의 문제가 아닙니다.

셋째, 더 중요한 것은 <면책성과 비밀주의의 제도화>입니다. 일반 미군 작전보다 훨씬 비밀스러운 특수작전을 국가안보의 중심수단으로 사용하면서 외부의 감시가 따라가지 못했다는 것입니다. 제가 앞서 이 인터뷰의 핵심을 “impunity”라고 말씀드린 이유가 바로 이것입니다.

그러나 트럼프와는 다르게 평가합니다

이 점이 아주 흥미롭습니다. 인터뷰 마지막 부분에서 하프는 자신의 책이

“every U.S. president since 2001”

을 비판하며, <Obama와 Biden에 대한 비판도 피하지 않는다>고 명시적으로 말합니다. 그러나 곧이어 트럼프의 역할은 특수전 문화에 대해 “uniquely malignant”, 즉 <특별히 해악적>이었다고 평가합니다.

그 차이는 다음과 같습니다.

대통령하프의 비판에서의 위치
George W. Bush9·11 이후 비밀전·특수전·이라크전 체제를 만든 출발점
Barack Obama그 체제를 폐기하지 않고 <훨씬 확대·제도화>
Donald Trump면책을 넘어 일부 폭력적 특수부대원들을 <공개적으로 영웅화>
Joe Biden기본적인 특수전·대테러 구조를 근본적으로 해체하지 않음

트럼프와 관련하여 하프가 특히 문제 삼는 것은 Navy SEAL 에디 갤러거(Eddie Gallagher) 사건입니다. 동료들이 민간인 및 포로에 대한 범죄를 고발했는데도 트럼프가 대통령 권력을 이용해 그를 옹호함으로써 “폭력적 행동을 해도 최고권력자가 보호할 수 있다”는 신호를 보냈다는 것이죠.

반면 오바마의 문제는 훨씬 <제도적>입니다.

그래서 오히려 오바마 사례가 더 생각할 만합니다

오바마는 부시의 이라크전을 비판하고 법치와 다자주의를 강조했던 대통령입니다. 그런데 그런 대통령조차 특수전과 드론전의 효율성과 정치적 편리함을 받아들였습니다.

왜 그랬을까요?

대규모 지상군 전쟁은 미군 사망자가 발생하고 의회·언론·국민의 관심을 받습니다. 반면

<소수 특수부대 + CIA + 드론 + 현지 대리세력>

방식은 미국 국내에서 정치적 비용이 훨씬 작습니다.

따라서 평화를 지향하는 대통령에게조차 매력적일 수 있습니다. “전쟁을 줄인다”고 생각하면서 동시에 <보이지 않는 전쟁을 확대>할 수 있는 것입니다.

바로 여기에 하프의 책이 제기하는 상당히 중요한 역설이 있습니다.

<Obama did not invent the system. He normalized and expanded it.>

그리고 시간이 지나면서 그 비밀전쟁에서 형성된 폭력·면책·약물·비밀주의의 문화가 포트 브래그 내부와 미국 사회로 역류했다는 것이 하프의 큰 논리입니다.

따라서 질문하신 “Obama is also implicated?”에 가장 정확한 답은 <Yes—quite substantially, but at the level of policy and institutional responsibility, not as a participant in the Fort Bragg crimes>입니다.

저는 오히려 이 점이 이 인터뷰를 단순한 <트럼프 비판>보다 훨씬 흥미롭게 만든다고 봅니다. 하프의 논리를 따라가면 문제는 어느 한 “나쁜 대통령”이 아니라, <Bush → Obama → Trump → Biden을 관통하면서 대통령이 바뀌어도 계속 팽창해 온 미국의 비밀전쟁 체제> 자체이기 때문입니다.

===

Transcript
Search in video
Intro
0:03
[Music]
0:10
The decades of warfare in the Middle East and global war on terror have spawned a vast secret army embodied in
0:17
special operations units such as the Green Beret, Navy Seals, and the shadowy Delta Force. Seth Harp in his book, The
0:25
Fort Bragg Cartel, calls Delta Force, for example, quote, a high-tech death
0:30
squad dedicated to covertly liquidating the male population base of a recalcitrant ethnic and tribal group
0:37
that resists US military occupation. These secret units, whose very existence
0:43
is not officially acknowledged and whose vast budgets are hidden, number some
0:48
70,000. Harp in his book details how these units are beyond scrutiny and
0:53
accountability. How they swiftly went rogue when deployed overseas, murdering and torturing with impunity, as well as
1:00
ingesting and trafficking prodigious quantities of drugs. These elite soldiers returned to the US not only
1:07
with the skill sets of professional killers, but layers of trauma and rage
1:13
that fuel acts of violence, including murder, sometimes of their wives and partners. HARP documents dozens of
1:20
unsolved killings and suicides, some of which appear highly suspicious, in and
1:25
around Fort Bragg, where units such as Delta Force are based. There were 105
1:30
deaths at the base between 2020 and 2021 alone. His book details how military
1:36
alliances with the world's leading drug dealers, especially in Afghanistan, where the US backed puppet state, was
1:43
the world's preeminent heroin cartel, led many in these units, to engage in
1:48
distribution and sale of vast quantities of narcotics up and down the eastern
1:53
seabboard. He chronicles the corruption that came with the deliveries of vast sums of money in shrink wrapped pallets
2:01
to buy allegiances in Afghanistan. deliveries that saw some of these soldiers pill for funds, billions of
2:08
dollars worth, and come home with tens of thousands of dollars taped to their bodies, money often used to jumpstart
2:14
drug dealing. Katherine Lutz in her book Homefront, her 2002 study on Fagatville,
2:20
where Fort Bragg is located, calls the town quoted dumping ground for the problems of the American century of war
2:27
and empire, where the wounds of war have pierced most deeply and are most visible. Along with narcotics, elite
2:34
soldiers sell pilford weapons from military bases on the black market.
2:39
Sales that have amounted to billions in lost dollars. Joining me to discuss his book, The Fort Bragg Cartel and the rise
2:46
of these secret armies is Seth Harp. First of all, it's a great book. It does
What is Delta Force?
2:52
what all great uh it's a very well written. what all great works of non-fiction should do, which is take a
2:59
microcosm and extrapolate outwards to explain uh uh a cultural or social
3:06
millu. I I can't uh praise it enough. Um it's also just a great read. Um so let's
3:14
begin Seth with uh defining for us uh delta force itself um how it was formed.
3:24
is a product of course of the Vietnam War uh and what it does. Thanks Chris. Uh Delta Force is what's
3:31
called a special mission unit um which are secretive and elite um units
3:37
specially drawn from the special uh forces of the army army special forces
3:43
or green berets also the army rangers if you it's open to uh service members from
3:48
all branches but primarily draws from those those army formations. So, it's kind of a higher tier to the special
3:54
forces or the most elite tier of the special forces and it's entirely uh dedicated to covert actions or things
4:02
that uh the government um either will deny uh or will say nothing about their
4:07
own role in. Uh and um as you alluded to earlier, during the wars in Iraq and
4:12
Afghanistan, the the unit effectively functioned um as you know what I
4:18
describe as a as a death squad. Um, and uh,
Counterproductive Special ops
4:26
what what are they? I mean, so I had a had a friend of mine who was a ranger in
4:31
Afghanistan, and they would be based in a certain area. They would build relationships
4:37
with local leaders. Uh, and then suddenly in the middle of the night, one
4:42
of these black ops units would descend and shoot a bunch of people uh, and then disappear. and they would uh bear the
4:50
the brunt of all the understandable rage and anger including the the attacks from
4:56
the Taliban. Uh I mean he saw these forces and I think as you mentioned in
5:01
the book Schwarzkoff did as well as really counterproductive uh to the stated mission of uh those who were
5:10
trying to domesticate Iraq and Afghanistan. Yeah, that's not a common that's not an uncommon sentiment to hear
5:17
from uh either tier 2 special forces or guys in the conventional military, the
5:22
regular army. Um that these units because they're so secretive and siloed
5:27
off because they don't share any of their operational plans with anybody uh and never talk about them afterwards.
5:34
They kind of come in and do their own thing, which typically tends to be, you know, striking a target and leaving
5:39
everyone there dead and the building on fire and then just leaving. And nobody can really explain where uh the intel
5:45
for that operation cames from. Many cases, perhaps as high as uh 50% of the cases, they're hitting targets based on
5:53
faulty intelligence by mistake. So completely unaccountable. And those assassinations
5:59
um were very counterproductive uh in Afghanistan in particular. Um the Afghan client sate that we set up
6:06
as pliable as it was undermed Karzai and later under Ashraf Ghani complained constantly about these night raids. Um
6:14
drone strikes we hear have heard a lot more about there have been more reporting and more books and research
6:20
done on drone strikes. The other component of it was these night rays or these assassination missions um which
6:27
were designed or intended to uh decapitate and incapacitate uh the
6:33
Taliban resistance but of course wholly failed to to to um achieve that mission
6:39
in the end. Well, as you point out in the book, the way they got target lists was often confiscating cell phones under
F3EAD intelligence
6:46
interrogation or from and then just adding the people on the cell phones to the list. Uh, isn't that correct?
6:52
That's correct. And honestly, even if you share um even if you subscribe to the, you know, the policy assumptions
7:00
and are supportive of US foreign policy and support these wars, uh you should still be very concerned about the
7:06
quality of intelligence um which is wholly outside any kind of um review. No
7:12
one really knows exactly how they generate targets uh except we do know that it's highly fallible. So even if
7:18
you support, you know, waging war in Afghanistan for 20 years, um I think should be concerned about the curtain of
7:25
secrecy that's around these units and the fact that often times they themselves really don't know who they're targeting and they're I think highly
7:31
overconfident in their own assessments which turn out to be um you know very
7:37
flawed. So Seth, the these people are uh handed all sorts of uh drugs uh dextro
7:45
amphetamines which lead to addictions. But before I get into that, I just want to read a little passage from your book.
Billy Lavigne’s violence
7:51
Uh you focus at the beginning of uh their two best friends, Ash actually
7:57
Leser and Lavine. Uh and uh Lavine ends
8:02
up killing Leager. Um but I just want to read this paragraph. One night at his
8:08
house, Lavine confessed to Nicole, I think that was his sister, that he had once shot and killed a child. He was
8:14
just a little boy, he told her, but he had a gun. He also introduced her to his dog, a totally poised, hyper alert
8:22
Belgian uh Malininoa named Rocky that had been one of the unit's working
8:29
animals. Nicole wanted to know why it had no teeth. Lavine told her that its
8:34
titanium dentures had been surgically removed upon retirement because the dog had been trained to attack and it growed
8:41
accustomed to feeding on the flesh of people killed in special operations raids, including being allowed as a
8:48
treat to eat human brains. Horrifying, I know. Um, and actually
8:57
people seized upon and there's a lot of criticism, some criticism of my work. It's very much mixed. There are certain
9:03
forums where current and former special operations soldiers talk about a number of things and my book sometimes comes
9:09
up. Some of them are supportive of it and agree that I've accurately diagnosed certain systemic problems in the
9:15
community. Others attack it and say that it's exaggerated. And this is one thing um that the um you know opponents of of
9:23
the work um seized upon to say that this can't be true. This is proof that um I
9:29
am just recycling, you know, tall tales that were told, you know, to in this
9:34
case Nicole Rick. You know, they're criticizing the fact that it's women who are telling me this. Nicole is a sister of a Green Beret is not coming directly
9:41
from someone at the unit and they're saying, you know, these are just crazy stories that they're either telling to impress women or scare them or whatever.
9:48
Um but in response to th those comments, somebody on the Kiwi Farms forum, which
9:54
is where this takes conversation takes place, posted an actual video of almost
9:59
the same thing that I was describing. It was a clearly marked special operations K9, a Belgian Malininoa um that was
10:07
attacking a dead body uh of clearly clearly a South Asian person, Middle
10:13
Eastern. uh it's hard to say the person is covered in blood, but the dog is attacking him right around the head area
10:20
just as I had described uh in the book. So, the fact that that video footage even existed to me was shocking. Um and
10:27
then the fact that someone had posted it even more so. Not only that, you know, talking about, you know, brains and
10:34
stuff. I mean, it's these details are gruesome and horrifying. I include them advisedly not to shock people. There's a
10:41
lot of stuff that I leave out because it's successive, gratuitous, but Lavine himself wrote a memoir of his time in
10:47
the service and he he talks about executing at close range a unarmed prisoner uh who was seized in a 2015
10:55
raid in Syria, the target of which was a guy named Abu Sai, Tunisian oil trader who was a top who was believed to be a
11:02
top ISIS figure. Um, and Lavine says that um, you know, a piece of this
11:08
person's brain flew into his mouth cuz his mouth was open at the time he pulled the trigger. And he talks about having
11:14
to wash the taste of brains out of his mouth. So, this type of intense close
11:20
uh, range brutality uh, and gore and violence is a is a normal part of what
11:27
it was like to be a Delta Force operator during the 20 years of the wars in Iraq
11:32
and Afghanistan. and I think goes a long way towards explaining how some of them came to seem like such brain damaged
11:39
Frankenstein monsters like like Lavine uh tragically ended up being.
11:45
Oh, there's a moment in the book where uh I think she's a woman, but she's in the military and let's be clear, you're
11:50
a veteran and I and you served in Afghanistan um Iraq, excuse me. And um she talks
11:57
about somebody coming back from a mission and there's brain on his boots. there's human brain on his boots,
12:04
right? Um, and as as distressing it as as it is to hear those kind of details,
12:12
we should be aware of it because that's what we, you know, our military that we pay for, that's what they go out and do.
12:18
their job is to go out uh and and kill people um in service of these
12:24
increasingly obscure and abstract national security objectives that are shared by not a large swath of of the
12:31
population but rather um most of the people who who live and work in Washington DC.
Drug use
12:38
So I want to talk about drugs um which play an important uh part in the in the
12:45
uh text of your work. Um they're given drugs by the military. Uh it leads to
12:51
addictions. Uh when you write about Lavine, uh you write by 2008 he was smoking
12:59
crack on a daily basis and regularly ingested MDMA, smoked crystal,
13:05
methamphetamine, snorted powder heroin, and had even taken to inserting speedballs, a dangerous mixture of
13:11
heroin and cocaine into his rectum in a dissolvable capsule to get a quicker and more powerful high. the the drugs and
13:20
alcohol. I mean, the amount that these people ingest, of course, uh is kind of
13:26
staggering. And we'll talk about the drug dealing later, but talk about how pervasive that was and the the
13:33
culpability of the military and kind of kickstarting these habits.
13:38
The military prescribed special operators dextroetamine as a matter of course, uh commonly known as Adderall.
13:45
Um, it is an amphetamine that allows you to stay awake for long periods of time uh and to tolerate sleeplessness that
13:52
some of these missions require. It also has the effect um whether incidental or
13:57
not of um increasing aggression uh and suppressing empathy. Uh in Lavine's
14:04
case, he specifically cited the prescription he had been given to Adderall as precipitating his drug
14:10
issues uh which is a common um sort of gateway or path towards abuse of hard harder substances. He started crushing
14:17
and snorting his aderall, taking double the dose that was given to him. Uh and then pretty soon he graduated to just
14:23
just using cocaine and smoking crack cocaine. Uh and then his drug uh use and
14:29
dependency deteriorated from there. Um, more generally in the community, um,
14:34
there's a ton of drinking. I mean, alcoholism is a major factor of life in the special forces. And it's not to be
14:41
puritanical or to be judgmental, uh, of these people. I mean, a lot of people in our country struggle with substance
14:47
abuse. It's actually one of the most salient aspects of American society. Um
14:53
but I think that there is a kind of um there's a kind of um there's a there's a
14:59
sense in which it becomes necessary in order to to um cope with the pressures
15:05
of of a job like being an operator on Delta Force. Um the need to to numb the
15:11
pain and grief that comes from participating uh in in this type of violence. um and also you know in
15:19
readjusting or trying to readjust to civilian life because a lot of them are almost literally addicted to adrenaline
15:26
and um need stimulation at all times. I mean a lot of these guys um their psychological
15:33
makeup is such that they're constantly in need of stimulation and they really don't like to be bored. Uh and so those
15:39
are traits all of which are traits that that um you know are conducive to to drug use. And I think those are some of
15:46
the reasons why you've seen such widespread prevalence of of drug use in the in the Green Beretss and in the
15:52
airborne corps all at Fort Bragg to a degree that you don't see elsewhere in in the US military.
Patriots vs. degens
15:59
You quote Terrell, you said the unit guys kind of separate themselves into
16:04
two groups. um Terrell who like leaker aspired to
16:09
join Delta Force but failed to meet the rigorous and often arbitrary selection criteria. Quote, "You have the tea
16:16
toters, the guys who are super Christian warriors for God, no drugs, no alcohol,
16:21
super goody goody by the book. Then you have the guys who are just complete [ __ ] derelcts, constantly doing
16:28
nefarious [ __ ] Those are the ones you write about in the book, right? That's right. I don't focus on
16:35
the sort of good apples, so to speak. They do exist. Um the guys that by their own internal ethical lights are doing
16:41
the right thing. Uh we may quibble with, you know, the the inherent nature of their job or the the foreign policy
16:47
objectives to which they're tasked to serve. Um nevertheless, they're not just
16:52
engaged in blatantly criminal activity, but a shocking number of people in these special mission units are. Uh and I
16:59
think that's something that we should all be very concerned about. you rais a point. It's fairly early in the book and
Waco cult shooting
17:04
it's about the wos. So this is the uh branch devidian these splinter group of
17:10
the 7th day advent uh they've stockpile weapons in anticipation of judgment day
17:16
there's a standoff uh after this is you writing after a
17:22
lengthy standoff in which the members of the apocalyptic offshoot church refused to surrender their guns and ammo the
17:28
federal agents moved in with surprisingly aggressive tactics making use of heavy machine guns armored
17:35
personnel carriers and even tanks. Amid the resulting gun battle, scores of people burned to death, including dozens
17:43
of women and children. And then you write a full six years later, it emerged that notwithstanding the PY commitatus
17:49
act, which bars the military from acting as a domestic law enforcement agency,
17:55
Delta Force operators have played a key part in the assault on the compound. So this is always you know my and it's a
18:04
question for you the the extent to which these forces we know they were you
18:10
document they were used in Waco can be used domestically and then of course you
18:16
have people when they leave uh the the Delta Force or SEALs are snapped up by
18:24
well the Gazi Humanitarian Foundation is one but uh paramilitary groups, Eric,
18:30
which Eric Prince runs. Uh they uh can be recruited into ICE. Um but I I I I
18:38
found that a kind of important point in the book. Yeah, certainly. I mean, I wasn't aware
18:45
that Delta Force had played a role in the in the Waco raid. I'm actually from Austin, so Waco's just an hour north of
18:50
here. Um and um the I think the
18:56
relationship between Delta Force and the FBI is is a cause for some concern. Um
19:01
they have a very close working relationship and um you know Delta Force is supposed to play an advisory role uh
19:09
to help you know let's say the FBI's hostage rescue team uh deal with an active shooter situation or something of
19:15
that nature. Um but you know the posi commatis act which bars the military
19:21
from acting in a domestic law enforcement role uh I think should be a higher bar towards you know the
19:26
participation of units like this in domestic law enforcement situations and we're seeing today I mean that was that
19:32
was many years ago almost 30 years ago and um you know today we're seeing once again a sort of militarization of law
19:39
enforcement in the United States you know these ICE guys and that's leads me to a broader point that's maybe worth
19:45
touching on the sort of trickle down cultural effects of this of these units and units like them where everyone wants
19:51
to be a bearded special operator. everyone whatever military unit in or whatever police uh whether they're just
19:58
you know regular cops working in beat they all adopt these aesthetics and attitudes of these units which is like
20:05
you know the longer hair the beards the tattoos just the the Oakley sunglasses
20:10
just the whole um you know image that of the of the special operator is something
20:15
that has come to have widespread cultural currency in our society and I
20:20
think um much for the worse Uh because, you know, when they're dressed like that
20:26
and when they're comporting themselves like that, they can't help but look at all of us the same way as they looked at
20:31
Iraqis uh and Afans and Syrians and operations overseas, which are just, you
20:37
know, threats, you know, to be neutralized, people to be to surveiled and then killed as needed.
Ali Mohammed
20:44
Before we go into the drug dealing, I want you to talk about Ali Muhammad. This is a fascinating
20:51
uh story. I I'll let you tell it. Sure. Um, you know, I think they So, I
20:57
briefly recapitulate the history. The book is not a work of history. It's a it's intended to be a murder mystery at
21:04
the heart of it. Quite a kind of a police uh kind of police beat reporting. Um, but in order to tell this the
21:11
backstory of these operators lives, I recapitulate a brief history of the
21:16
global war on terrorism with a focus on Fort Bragg soldiers in particular because Fort Bragg is really the beating
21:22
heart of the global special operations complex and many people are unaware of its centrality in all of these events.
21:28
So when it came to 9/11 and telling the story of 9/11 in a way that I hope could be fresh, I focused on a role of a Fort
21:34
Bragg soldier whose name was Ali Muhammad. He was actually born in Egypt
21:40
uh and was a special forces soldier in Egypt but came over Fort Bragg is the home to the JFK special warfare center
21:46
in school um which often hosts or sponsors foreign military officers uh
21:51
they're from countries that are allied with the United States such as Egypt. There they often become assets of either
21:58
the CIA or just assets of the national security uh institutions in general. Um
22:03
Ali Muhammad was one of those people. Um, it's a question of how deeply we want to get into it because this guy's
22:10
career was quite uh extensive. But in short, he was some kind of operative in
22:15
the CIA's war in Afghanistan against the Russian occupiers in the 1980s. He was
22:21
deeply involved in that. Um, most likely as an asset of the CIA. We know that he
22:26
had been approached by the CIA. We know that he was monitored by them and that he was receiving money from obscure sources. Um he also became a US citizen
22:35
and actually joined the army and was stationed at Forbra as a uniformed American soldier which I think is
22:40
important to point out because subsequently he became a close associate of Iman al- Zawahhiri who of course was
22:47
the co-founder of al-Qaeda with Osama bin Laden. Ali Muhammad, this American soldier, uh,
22:55
then went on to personally train Osama bin Laden and all of Osama bin Laden's
23:00
core security detail in special operations warfare tactics, specifically
23:05
using manuals that he took from Fort Bragg, and trained them in all sorts of things, you know, surveillance and
23:11
ambushes, including in how to hijack airplanes. He specifically taught the core uh leaders of al-Qaeda how to
23:20
hijack airplanes using box cutters. It was that specific because we have a copy
23:25
of the training manual um or the FBI has a copy of the training manual that Ali Muhammad used to train these guys. Now
23:32
Ali Muhammad was was reeled in somehow to the United States uh after the Kenya
23:39
and Tanzania bombings in 1998. So he had was brought back to the United States and he was sort of kind of arrested,
23:48
sort of kind of indicted and prosecuted more or less in these closed doors
23:54
anonymized federal court proceedings that no one witnessed. And then after that, before he was actually sentenced,
24:02
he was just disappeared into the bowels of the US government. and nothing has ever been heard from him since. Which is
24:08
crazy because in the sort of canonical accounts that you hear about 9/11 uh and
24:14
the c the deep causes behind 9/11, why this event befell our country, um it's
24:20
often acknowledged the role of the CIA's war in Afghanistan in creating the conditions that led to the rise of
24:26
al-Qaeda. But if you read mainstream Pulitzer Prizewinning reporters who have
24:32
written the most extensive accounts of of 9/11, what they will always say is
24:38
that there was no direct contact between Osama bin Laden and anyone in the CIA.
24:44
And to date, there has never been any evidence of direct contact between the agency and Osama bin Laden. But what
24:50
that omits is the fact that there was a direct extensive um and uh longlasting
24:57
relationship between Osama bin Laden and an active duty member of the US Army
25:02
special forces. So I think that's a really significant omission especially because this guy is still in US custody
25:08
somewhere. He lived in Osama bin Laden's house in Pakistan, right? In Peshawar, right?
Military psy-ops
25:15
Um I'm going to just to move on, but you write a lot
25:21
about the the blowback in terms of domestic violence, the wife killings at
25:27
Fort Bragg. Um, and there was a series of killings, I
25:33
think, what was it, six spouses or something or murdered or I can't remember the number. But then uh of
25:39
course the the Fort Bragg and in particular uh the Delta commanders just
25:44
go into overdrive to to exonerate everybody from these killings, most of them, and cover it up. And they actually
25:51
begin to spin bizarre theories uh that uh the anti- uh malarial drug
26:01
Maleficquin uh which is Larium which I took in the southern Sudan is to blame that I mean
26:08
just and the media buys it. I mean the the one of the kind of minor subtexts of
26:14
your book is just how easily the media is just spun by these people repeatedly.
26:20
Yeah. The special forces are expert in psychological operations and SCOPS are a
26:26
big part of what they do. Now um by law those psychological operations have to be directed at foreign populations. They
26:33
can't be directed at American citizens. But not only is there a lot of bleedback in the age of the internet, but also
26:40
these guys when they're dealing with the media, they um sort of naturally inhabit that role and that ability to spin and
26:47
manipulate and they're quite capable of controlling media coverage of their operations through selective um leaks
26:53
and selective disclosures. In the case that you're talking about in 2002 when um four Fort Bragg uh four
27:02
army wives stationed at Fort Bragg were murdered in short succession by their husbands all of whom or nearly all of
27:07
whom were special forces soldiers who had just returned from Afghanistan. That looks really bad. That could cause a
27:13
call into question um you know the relationship between American militarism
27:19
and certain forms of blowback especially violence against women. But instead of that, some senior officials from Delta
27:27
Force got on the phone with um credulous reporters from UPI and other um wire
27:34
services and newspapers of record and told them that the what had happened was that Larium, this malaria drug that they
27:41
had taken caused these guys to lose their mind and become paranoid and aggressive and in fact homicidal. This
27:48
is a ridiculous theory. There's no basis at all for it in medical science. Um,
27:54
it's completely untrue and unsupported. However, it was repeated by virtually
27:59
all mainstream media institutions in the United States and in foreign countries in France and Italy, all across Europe
28:05
and in Israel. Everyone reported that these guys had lost their minds from taking the malaria drug. Um, and I use
28:12
that in the book. I don't dwell on it long, but I use it as a just a case study in how they're able to control the
28:20
way that the media covers Delta Force operations and their blowback in in the United States.
Turbocharging special ops
28:27
So, you write about the huge expansion of these and Obama was really the figure that uh turbocharged
28:34
uh these special operations units. Um, but of course it depended on a false
28:40
narrative. It was justified by a false narrative. Uh, and that was spun by Mcrist, Stanley Mcristel. Uh, you write,
28:48
"Although there were relatively few foreign fighters in Iraq and most came from neighboring Syria, Mcrist was the
28:54
primary proponent of the view quick to spread among Washington policymakers that the enemy was not a nationalist
29:02
rebellion against outside occupation, but one node of a global conspiracy of
29:07
Americahating terrorists." To describe this nebulous and inherently malignant
29:12
foe, Mcrist and his staff invented the term al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI. Um, and of
29:21
course that just morphed into the global war on terror. Can you talk about that? When uh the Iraq war first began, of
29:28
course, it was premised on the idea that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction and might either
29:34
directly attack the United States or might provide terrorists with these weapons that they could then carry out
29:40
attacks in the United States. We know that this was false. This was a conspiracy theory that was invented by
29:46
the Bush administration and the CIA to justify the criminal invasion of Iraq.
29:51
it quickly became apparent that in fact there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Um and so at that
29:57
point the narrative pivoted. I actually happened to be deployed as a very junior
30:02
soldier to Iraq at that time 2004 and 5. And I remember this change taking place.
30:08
it suddenly became all now it became about this organization called al-Qaeda in Iraq and specifically this figure um
30:16
the Alzarqawi and I remember seeing his uh his face his picture on big billboard
30:22
wanted posters around Baghdad but looking into this deeply and
30:27
researching it I found that the role of Alzari was highly exaggerated and in
30:32
fact he may not have even been in Iraq at the time the reason why they latched upon this
30:38
uh this Jordanian of Palestinian descent who was by all accounts more of a criminal and a thug uh than than an
30:45
actual terrorist um was in order to um paste a sort of um mask upon the
30:52
insurgency and paint it as a um foreign as foreign fighters. Foreign fighters
30:58
were said to be coming into Iraq to fight the occupation. And so the evolving theory of the war became that
31:04
we need to be there so that we can fight them there so that we're not fighting them here. I even remember guys in my
31:10
own unit making that same argument when we would debate these things around the time of the 2004 election. Um but in
31:17
reality as Stanley Mcristel frankly acknowledges in his book they greatly
31:22
exaggerated Zarqawi's role and the role of foreign fighters in Iraq. There were there were hardly any foreign fighters
31:28
in Iraq as a percentage of the insurgency. most of them came from Syria which is very similar to Iraq in its
31:34
terms of its um ethnography. Um and uh the resistance the insurgency was
31:40
primarily nationalist resistance to outside occupation just like you would expect to see in any foreign country
31:46
that's been or any country that's been invaded uh by foreign forces. Um, so it
31:51
was a way for them to get around the fact that the insurgency was an essentially legitimate enterprise of resistance. And not only that, but also
31:58
to expand the war and say, well, now there's an al-Qaeda franchise in Syria and now there's an al-Qaeda franchise
32:04
here and there. And in reality, if you look deeply uh at these groups and at the evidence for, you know, what's being
32:11
described as them belonging to a so so-called decentralized franchise or cell of al-Qaeda, it's really absent any
32:18
actual command and control nodes, any actual communication between them and the original al-Qaeda, which was broken
32:25
into a million pieces and dispersed into the mountains of Pakistan and Yemen pretty early on in in the war in
32:32
Afghanistan. So again, this is a psychological warfare. This is psychological warfare that they're
32:37
waging in which they characterize the enemy in a way in which is conducive to the to the continuation of the war and
32:45
delegitimizing you know um resistance to US military occupation.
Indiscriminate killings / low quality intel
32:50
I just want to mention how indiscriminate the killing was.
32:56
Um, so JSOK, that is Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq, you write,
33:03
was hindered by an almost complete lack of Arabic skills within our force. Uh
33:08
you're quoting Mc Crystal suggesting that nearly all of those whom Delta killed were targeted based not on the
33:16
content of telephone intercepts but on pseudocientific nodal analysis tips from
33:22
paid informants and arbitrary guesswork. Um, we were not death squads, Mcrist
33:30
writes. And then you write, but armed with NSA intercepts backed by newly developed Reaper drones and joined by
33:37
fierce Kurdish mercenaries called Mohawks. That's exactly what Jac became
33:42
during the covert surge in Iraq, which lasted into 2008. the body count from
33:48
Delta Force Delta Force's killing spree and the proportion of Iraq's hundreds of
33:54
thousands of war dead who were gunned down in Jacock night raids will never be known because it wasn't recorded in the
34:02
first place. This is a point I really um hammer upon which is the low quality of intel and
34:09
the sort of unknown factor there. The X factor about the quality of JOX's
34:14
intelligence because again even if you support these foreign wars, what is the
34:20
reason to believe that they're attacking and killing the right people? Because it certainly hasn't been reflected in any
34:26
kind of positive outcome in those countries. And every uh uh every indication that I can ascertain suggests
34:33
that in fact they're very bad at identifying the people um that they're supposed to be fighting.
34:40
Well, I covered the war in El Salvador for 5 years and the death squads, which when I got to El Salvador were killing
34:45
between 700 and a,000 people a month were the best recruiting weapon the FMLN rebels had. I got to assume it was the
34:52
same in Iraq. And certainly in Afghanistan, that was the the main reason why the Taliban was resurgent.
34:59
That's supported by vast vast amounts of reporting uh on the ground talking to
35:05
people that were part of that were just part of the population or part of the Taliban. It was these night killings,
35:10
these night raids, these invasions of people's houses and the massacre of you know all the males and often times the
35:16
women too. um which is what made the Taliban seem preferable to the to the US
35:23
occupation in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. Let's talk about heroin. Um so you write
The US funded the largest cartel in the world
35:31
Afghanistan after 8 years of US occupation was now producing nine times more heroin than the rest of the world
35:38
combined. And of course that bled over into the Afghan population. Uh the
35:43
Afghan National Army was filled with addicts as you write. Um
35:49
um but then the alliance between in essence these uh narco traffickers
35:58
uh in the northern alliance and everywhere else uh essentially drew in
36:03
members of these special forces. Explain how that happened. So Afghanistan under US occupation
36:11
produced more than more heroin than the entire world could absorb. And the truth
36:17
around this phenomenon I think is one of the bestkept secrets of the 21st century. And the lack of awareness uh in
36:26
the general population among Americans is really astonishing. But it's not a
36:32
surprise their ignorance has been procured by the mass media and the government which is hiding this sort of
36:37
crime of the century. As I sometimes think about it, the um the 2000s and the
36:44
2010s were a time of a global heroin crisis around the world. In the United States uh as it's recent memory, people
36:52
are well aware that we had a terrible heroin crisis in this country. It became uh nearly the leading cause of death
36:58
among adults. and then of course morphed and transformed into the fentinel epidemic which is with us today and has
37:05
never been worse than it is right now. Well, the cause of that heroin crisis was down to the war in Afghanistan. The
37:12
war in Afghanistan caused the heroin crisis globally in Europe, in Russia, in
37:17
Australia, in Asia, uh and also in Canada and in the United States. All of
37:23
these countries, all these uh countries that have um you know that are either first world or have a large market for
37:28
drug users were inundated with high highly potent and very very cheap heroin
37:34
from Afghanistan during this time and it's just supply and demand. When there's that much of it, it becomes a lot cheaper. In the United States,
37:40
people whose um opiate addiction had been primed by loose prescribing practices around prescription pills
37:47
found that they could buy heroin for a lot cheaper than they could get, let's say, some percoet pills that have been
37:52
uh diverted from the elicit drug market. And the dirty secret that no one in in
37:58
government or media bothered to tell us all these years was that the people in Afghanistan that were producing that
38:03
drug, those drugs, they were people on the US payroll. They were they were um narco warlords that were that were
38:11
directly armed, sponsored, and protected by the CIA and the special forces. Uh and that complicity went all the way up
38:17
to the top of the corrupt Afghan client state. Hamemed Carzai and his family in
38:23
particular. Um you know the the they were definitely implicated in it and many other uh named warlords. You know,
38:29
I I have their names in the book and the site the sources that I cite to demonstrate for a fact that this
38:36
government, this client government in Afghanistan was effectively, you know, the biggest drug cartel in in world
38:42
history. And the fact that the United States, the whole of the United States government was complicit in this is
38:47
really mind-boggling to contemplate and um not enough people are aware of it in
38:52
my opinion. So, let's talk about how these special forces operators use the skills that
39:00
they have learned uh and become drug dealers. Um, you profile, I think his
39:07
name is Huff, a former state trooper. Um, uh, and then maybe Losas, I mean, so
39:15
you train, these people are highly trained uh, and they take those skills
39:20
into the drug market. talk about that process. I mean, the amount of of heroin
39:26
that was coming into uh the Fort Bragg area, there was a small airport near Fort Bragg that you
39:33
write about was kind of staggering. I mean, uh uh just massive amounts and
39:40
much of it was funneled through uh not just former members of special forces
39:47
units, but active members of special forces units. Yeah. Now, that airport, the Rafford
39:52
drop zone, um, or that PK Air Park it's sometimes called, that's a privately
39:57
owned business. And if I told a lie about them being involved in and their that institution, that facility being
40:03
involved in international drug trafficking, they could turn around and sue me for defamation really quickly.
40:09
But the facts are clear, the facts are nailed down. There are criminal prosecutions that have either taken
40:14
place or that have been fully adjudicated uh show that that airport is which is where Delta Force does its uh parachute
40:22
training has been a hub of international drug trafficking since the 1980s and
40:27
involving current or former special forces soldiers trafficking drugs into
40:32
the United States by air and landing them and offloading them in this um this airport that's within Fort Bragg's
40:38
airspace and is contiguous with the case um and has been a center of Delta Force
40:44
training for decades. Um most recently the the um manager of the airport, a guy
40:49
named Tim Faker, whose father Gene Thcker was an OG Green Beret who was the sort of the pioneer of this illicit
40:56
enterprise. Tim Thcker the son was convicted relatively recently uh of
41:01
methamphetamine trafficking and was said by North Carolina prosecutors to have been uh the biggest meth trafficker in
41:08
that state's history. That's just one story I tell about systemic drug trafficking taking place in the special
41:15
forces, you know, around Fort Bragg. And um, you know, to answer your question or to elaborate a little bit more, I think,
41:22
um, it often has to do with that need for stimulation that I talked about. Sometimes these guys aren't necessarily
41:28
doing it for money. Like you said, they have a certain skill set, this irregular warfare skill set, this attitude, this
41:33
mindset of um, doing things secretly and getting away with it. Uh that's something that tends to port over
41:39
relatively easily to the drug trade. And Billy Lavine in his memoir that he wrote
41:44
that I obtained after my book was published um he talks about specifically this about how as he started to get into
41:51
the drug game um and started meeting higher level drug traffickers, they were very interested in his background and
41:57
understood that his skill set was something very valuable to him. and he became an adviser to the cartel helping
42:03
them do things uh like understand police surveillance because of course as a Delta Force operator he understood these
42:09
things very very well what the cap capabilities uh and um limitations were of um
42:15
surveillance how it works and how to evade it and also he was helping them traffic drugs by air from Central
42:21
America into the United States uh including through the use of um uh cargo
42:27
uh like dropping uh dropping drug cargo with a parachute from a plane either
42:32
either without a person or accompanied by uh a parachute jumper. I mean, this is the tactic that has used at the
42:40
airport and in this community since the 1980s. They will fly drugs in from overseas and they will jump out with it
42:46
and uh into some of the national forests around North Carolina or Tennessee or Georgia um and uh and maybe come back
42:53
for it later or what have you. But that's the that's the game that they're playing at Fort Bragg. has been going on
42:58
for a long time and whenever it comes to light, it tends to get um passed over or actively covered up by the military
43:04
command. So, one of the things you write about in the book are a series of killings
Michael Hastings’ mysterious death
43:10
um including the killing of Lavine in
43:15
murky circumstances. You bring up web and then you talk, which I didn't know
43:20
until I read your book, that they have the capacity to take over the steering mechanism of a car. So, I mean, this is
43:27
the kind of things they do overseas, but there are uh many incidents,
43:34
especially around Fort Bragg, that uh seem to suggest they're doing this domestically.
43:41
Um I I think you may be referring to the case of Michael Hastings, the reporter. I'm sorry, Hastings. I was Hastings.
43:47
Yes. Gary Webb is the reporter who shot him twice. That was the contra he Yeah. Mhm.
43:54
Um and uh so but I see obviously why those uh two men would be related in
44:01
your mind. They're certainly related in mine. Um they are reporters who who died
44:06
mysteriously, you know, after reporting on these type of issues. Michael Hastings was the guy was the Rolling
44:13
Stone reporter who got Stanley Mcrist fired. Um, and he, you know, because he
44:18
wrote the runaway general, which, uh, you know, depicted Mcrist and his aids getting drunk and making jokes about
44:24
President Biden's staff. Um, you know, Mcrist of course being the architect being the the the sort of godfather of
44:31
modern Jac, uh, and the architect of the assassination programs in Iraq and in Syria and in Afghanistan. Um, so, you
44:40
know, what happened to Hastings after that is, uh, is, uh, ambiguous. Um it's
44:45
not clear exactly how he died, but there's a video of his car crashing. Um
44:50
and um it's hard to understand what happened there, why he he was sober at the time of his death, contrary to
44:57
the article that the shameful article that New York Magazine published insinuating that Michael Hastings was
45:03
under was had a drug problem and was under the influence at the time of his death. That was a lie. He was sober when
45:08
he died. Um and the the car appears on the video. It seems like it's a grainy
45:14
video, but it seems like it explodes before it crashes. And people who called 911 talked about it being uh talked
45:20
about hearing an explosion rather than a car crash. Um, now again, it was ruled
45:25
an accident and Michael Hastings's own family supports the view that it was an accident. So, I don't want to make
45:31
irresponsible allegations, but it is the case that in 2017, several years later,
45:36
uh there was a hack of the CIA's um CIA documents that was released by Wikileaks. One of the documents there
45:43
was something from their embedded device branch of the CIA uh which showed that the the agency was researching how to
45:51
infect onboard uh car computers uh with malware that would allow them to to
45:56
conduct undetectable assassinations by steering a car into an immovable object
46:02
at high speed. So obviously when that came out um you know the conspiracy theories around Hastings's death really
46:07
resurged and and and have really never been dispelled as far as I'm concerned.
Lavigne’s death
46:12
Let's talk about some of these killings around Fort Bragg uh including the killing of Lavine
46:20
uh and he was with uh one of his uh drug partners. Was his name Dumi
46:27
Dumas? I can't remember. Um, but there's just a series of killings around there
46:32
that uh are inexplicable.
46:37
It's really shocking the the number and the frequency of these sort of soldier on soldier homicides, murders taking
46:44
place on base that appear to be like settling of accounts or drug deals gone wrong involving some of the most elite
46:50
soldiers in the army including Lavine uh Billy Lavine and Timothy Dumas is the is a sort of central murder mystery that I
46:57
explore in the book. Lavine, as I've alluded to several times already, was a Delta Force operator at the top of his
47:03
game and had done 14 deployments, you know, was 37 years old. Um, and had this
47:10
terrible drug problem that we discussed, was working with drug cartels, as we discussed. Um, and his life came to an
47:16
end in 2020. His body was found uh riddled with bullets and dumped in a
47:21
remote training uh range on Fort Bragg alongside the other soldier that you mentioned, Timothy Dumis, who was al was
47:28
a JOC support soldier uh who had deployed to Afghanistan at least four times uh and was in charge of securing
47:35
the supply lines for the special forces. Um and the police say that this was a drug deal gone wrong. Uh that in itself
47:42
is is shocking that that kind of thing can take place on Fort Bragg involving guys like that who are in such
47:48
privileged positions uh uh in the military uh hierarchy and um you know
47:55
both of them had previously killed people. Lavine had killed uh a green beret at his house green Mark Leer and a
48:01
few years earlier in 2018 he had killed this guy and the military and the and the civilian. And let's be clear they covered it up.
48:08
He he was completely exonerated even though as you document in the book uh
48:14
the scenario that they accepted was not supported by the evidence. Won't go into
48:19
the details but they completely got him off. Correct. And that led directly to his
48:24
own death because Lavine was so out of control that he needed to be in prison. He was a danger to himself. He was a
48:29
danger to other people. And um he may have killed other people in the interim. His memoir certainly suggests that he
48:37
hints broadly at doing hit jobs for the cartel. Um so that uh that act of
48:43
malfeence and dereliction of duty committed by the district attorney of uh Cumberland County as well as the army's
48:50
uh criminal investigations division that led to these other deaths. Uh and they I
48:56
think there they should be reckoning around that the responsibility for that. But the question remains, who was
49:02
responsible for killing these guys? Because it was a professional job. These are not easy people to kill. Lavine in
49:07
particular was somebody who was a very competent um you know military operator
49:13
who had been who would be hard to get the drop on to say the least. Dumis, same story. He was a very hard hard man.
49:21
All these guys always went around armed uh and um they knew what who they were
49:26
dealing with. Dangerous people. So, who was responsible for killing them and dumping their bodies on Fort Bragg?
49:32
Well, I don't want to spoil um the last chapter of my book. Uh but suffice it to say, the person that the that the that
49:38
the DOJ is attempting to pin those crimes on, I have really struggled to
49:44
find anybody who accepts the government story because it's so on its face uh is
49:51
so implausible. I want to talk about loas. So these are
Los Zetas
49:56
the the big Mexican drug cartel. You write, "The advent of Lozetas, who
50:01
really were naroterrorists, inaugurated the darkest era in all of Mexican history. Trained in marksmanship, rapid
50:08
deployment, ambushes, surveillance, and psychological operations, Losas used
50:14
overt military force to consolidate control over most of the Texas border and the Gulf Coast port of Verarac Cruz,
50:22
augmented by the state and local police forces that they co-opted, as well as an endless supply of short-lived hitmen
50:29
recruited from the lumpen class of the northern borderlands. Lozettas wore paramilitary uniforms, drove around in
50:36
homemade armored vehicles called monstros, and to so terror filmed
50:42
themselves committing sickening atrocities. Countless thousands died in
50:47
their raids, assaults, and sprees of arson. Countless thousands more were
50:52
abducted and disappeared. a sophisticated criminal militia that used encrypted communications and had the
51:00
backing of deep pocketed investors, powerful lawyers, and many Mexican
51:05
politicos. Loettas leveraged their military control over large sws of
51:10
territory to diversify into nearly every illicit enterprise imaginable, reaping
51:16
billions of dollars in profits. And where did they come from?
51:21
So, Lozettas are a perfect example of how US militarism and intervention in
51:28
foreign countries, in this case, Mexico, stimulates drug trafficking and spreads
51:33
terrorism and murder uh to the countries that are that are victimized um by this
51:38
these forms of imperialism. The Lettas were uh trained by the special forces.
51:45
This is a Mexican special forces unit that was trained by the US Green Beretss including at Fort Bragg, also at Fort
51:52
Benning and they also were trained by Israeli instructors. Um, and they were
51:57
meant to be uh in the mold of the Green Berets. They were meant to be the Mexican Green Berets. But they, this
52:03
unit quickly after being used to savagely suppress the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in the mid 90s, they went
52:11
rogue and looked around the uh, you know, the sort of underworld scene in Mexico and realized, hey, you know,
52:16
nobody we're we're the baddest dudes around and, you know, we can we can run this game if we want. And that's exactly
52:22
what they did. they defected from the Mexican state and became the most notorious cartel in Mexican history. Uh,
52:29
Losettas, um, which really precipitated the terrible homicide crisis that continues
52:36
in Mexico to this day in which hundreds of thousands of people have died because of this new model of a paramilitary
52:43
cartel. uh you know where it's just it's guys who have who have expert military
52:48
training who are using that military training directly to affectuate you know drug trafficking uh operations and
52:55
control large swats of territory. That's a model that was picked up by other cartels in Mexico. Loettas to today are
53:03
are fragmented uh and and isolated. Uh but you know the the model that was
53:08
created continues to to the great great detriment of Mexico. And again, it's an
53:14
example just like in Afghanistan where we have, you know, what's described as a narco state um and what are described as
53:21
narco terrorists. So if you look into the background, if you run the clock back, you'll see what originally started
53:27
this was the um you know the the the uh US intervention and the incompetence or
53:34
malice uh misjudgment just everything misguided about it uh of the way that we
53:40
deal with foreign countries and the way in which we try to co-opt them and use them to carry out you know our national
53:46
our national security objectives. You close the book by talking about
The Return of Fort Bragg
53:51
Hegsth, the new Trump administration, uh, restoring the name
53:58
of Fort Bragg. It had been renamed Fort Liberty. Bragg was pretty mediocre Confederate general. And, uh, you know,
54:06
that last line of your book, Fort Bragg is back, is not just about the renaming
54:13
of the fort. It's about something else. uh those people that are now within the
54:19
Trump administration. Uh and of course, Hegsath has exonerated
54:25
the few very handful of people who have been uh prosecuted for war crimes, but talk
54:33
about the the the culture, the return of that culture and its
54:40
uh and those within the Trump administration who will empower it. So, my book is very critical of every US president since 2001. Um, and I don't um stent on uh critiquing President Obama or President Biden. However, I do see President Trump's role in his first term
54:59
as uniquely malignant uh on this culture and the trickle down effects of it have been just terrible because not only did
55:06
Trump loosen the rules of engagement that are applicable to special operations, but he also made it a big
55:12
part of his political persona um to hold up these accused war criminals, people like Eddie Gallagher who have been
55:18
turned in by his own teammates and ostracized by his own organization, the Navy Seals. But Trump elevated him and
55:25
made him out to be an American hero. Uh and also he k he just to interrupt he killed was
55:31
it a boy? Right. He killed a uh Gallagher. Eddie Gallagher killed a lot of people.
55:38
Eddie Gallagher was on drugs. Incidentally, he was taking as uh Dave Phillips of the New York Times reports in his excellent book Alpha on the Eddie
55:45
Gallagher trial. Um, uh, Eddie Gallagher was taking a lot of drugs just like, you know, the seals have a lot of the same
55:51
issues as the as the Green Berets. Uh, so he was popping Tramodol, which is an opiate painkiller. And, um, he, uh, was
55:59
on this deranged quest to beat Chris Kyle, another very toxic figure in this
56:05
story, who was, uh, you know, claimed to be the most lethal sniper in American history. So Eddie Gallery just wanted to
56:10
beat his kill count. um which is uh as his own teammates described him freaking
56:16
evil. Uh and in order to do this, he was just shooting and during the battle of Mosul in 2017 in Iraq, he was just
56:22
shooting anybody that came into his gun sites. This is according to his teammates. This is what they've alleged
56:27
publicly. He was shooting women, children, old men, people that were clearly unarmed. And then in the
56:33
incident you describe, he was caught on someone's body cam uh about to stab a teenage ISIS fighter in the neck who was
56:40
completely unconscious, incapable of resisting, unarmed. Um, and so his trial
56:46
was a three- ring circus in which President Trump personally intervened to have him uh well, he was exonerated by
56:52
the jury. I talk about the little tricks and behind the-scenes ways in which these trials tend to play out. You know,
56:58
when a special operator is accused of a crime, you'll often see and it proceeds to a trial, you'll often see that the
57:04
prosecutor in those cases is someone who has never tried a case before. That's a
57:10
pattern that that recurs, which is extraordinary, and it shows a lack of
57:15
intent to actually secure a conviction. In any case, in Gallagher's in Gallagher's case, he was acquitted of
57:21
the most serious charges. Um but um so that's a a great example of Trump's, you
57:27
know, the the cultural influence that Trump is having. And to bring it around to the the question that you asked about, you know, what's going on now
57:33
with Hexath and so forth, I think that it's fair to to to expect that in this
57:38
administration, we're going to see a further loosening of the rules around special operations. uh a further
57:44
increase in the impunity that these people enjoy uh and more of the sort of like paradical uh guys, you know, the
57:52
grungy motorcycle gang types coming to positions more prominence whereas, you
57:57
know, the sort of the sort of straightedged Titos, Warriors for God, we were talking about them earlier.
58:03
Those guys are going to be deemphasized and are going to get out of the military um because things are tending in in the
58:10
opposite direction towards towards lawlessness and murder that Trump and
58:15
Hegsth not only tolerate but actually openly celebrate.
58:21
You also write about Michael Waltz. You uh this is uh national Trump's national
58:28
security na national security adviserss. You call him a thuggish wararmonging
58:33
wararmongering dullard who holds the distinction of being the first green beret elected to Congress. Aside from
58:38
being the first former special forces officer to hold a seat in the House of Representatives, Mike Waltz was a
58:45
wealthy man. He made tens of millions of dollars running a private company that trains special operations units of the
58:53
drug trafficking Afghan army. Waltz, a passionate advocate for war in China,
58:58
China, has said that he expects the global war on terror to last a hundred years.
59:04
Yeah, Michael Waltz is a good example of the type of quote unquote leaders that are produced um by this organization,
59:10
the Army Special Forces. But I do I believe if I'm not mistaken, he was um
59:16
relieved of his uh position for being too openly subservient to Israel, which
59:22
is really extraordinary in the context of the Trump that that takes work in the Trump White House. [Laughter]
59:32
All right, Seth. It's a really great book and it's a great read. Um, I just cannot commend you enough as someone who
59:40
writes books and as a reporter. Um, yeah, it's just everyone should get it. Uh, the Fort Bragg Cartel. Uh, and I
Outro
59:47
want to thank, uh, Max, Diego, Thomas, Sophia, uh, and Victor who produced the show.
59:54
You can find me at chrisedges.substack.com. substack.com. Thanks for having me, Chris. It was a pleasure.
1:00:02
[Music]

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